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ABSTRACT
Sovereign debt restructuring strategies have been mostly reactive,
applying only once a nation’s debt burden becomes unsustainable. Reactive
strategies are suboptimal for many reasons, including that international law
does not yet provide mechanisms—in the corporate sector, provided by
bankruptcy law—for correcting collective action and other market failures
that impede the restructuring of sovereign debt. A financially troubled nation
often faces a dilemma: paying its debt would reduce its ability to provide
critical public services, but defaulting would further damage the nation’s
fiscal integrity and reputation and could even shock the broader economy.
Building on “proactive” strategies designed to resolve corporate debt
burdens, this Article examines the proactive resolution of government debt
burdens, first addressing the problem of unsustainable sovereign debt and
then addressing the growing crisis of unsustainable subnational debt.
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INTRODUCTION
Sovereign nations urgently need help in resolving unsustainable debt
burdens.
1
Paying that debt would reduce a nation’s ability to provide critical
public services,
2
whereas defaulting on that debt would further damage the
nation’s fiscal integrity and reputation and could even trigger a systemic
shock that harms the broader economy.
3
This dilemma is real and growing:
1. Unsustainable government debt is defined infra note 23 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth Strassner, New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring Needed,
Bankruptcy LawExpert Says, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 12, 2017, 4:21 PM), http://www.marketwa
tch.com/story/new-approach-to-sovereign-debt-restructuring-needed-bankruptcy-law-expert
-says-2017-10-12 [https://perma.cc/CM4Z-AV33] (highlighting a discussion of novel debt
restructuring approaches following debt crises in the Caribbean); Henry Foy, A Greek
Tragedy: HowMuch CanOne Nation Take?, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.ft.com/c
ontent/44478b7e-dd09-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce?mhq5j=e5 [https://perma.cc/DB2C-XYD
9] (discussing the debt crisis in Greece); Jonathan Watts, Venezuela on the Brink: A Journey
Through a Country in Crisis, THEGUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2016, 4:32 PM), https://www.theguardi
an.com/world/2016/oct/11/venezuela-on-the-brink-a-journey-through-a-country-in-crisis [htt
ps://perma.cc/YG7Z-L9XK] (noting the economic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela).
3. See, e.g., Associated Press, Eurozone Seeks to Stop Debt Crisis Domino Effect, CBS
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the median public debt of the sixty low-income developing countries
increased from 33.5% of gross domestic product (“GDP”) in 2013 to 47% of
GDP in 2017.
4
Eight of these countries are already in debt distress,
5
and
sixteen are facing a high risk of debt distress.
6
This Article seeks to help solve this dilemma by examining “proactive”
ways to resolve unsustainable governmental debt. In a separate article, I
examined how proactive strategies could help systemically important
financial firms resolve unsustainable debt.
7
Whether addressing firms or
governments, proactive-resolution strategies should follow the same
principles: convert debt that is beginning to become unsustainable
(“borderline unsustainable debt”) into sustainable financing, through pre-
planning; or try to prevent the debt from approaching unsustainability.
Proactive resolution differs from traditional resolution strategies, which
are primarily reactive. Corporate bankruptcy, for example, merely helps
firms react to debt burdens that already have become unsustainable.
8
Sovereign debt restructuring strategies have likewise been reactive.
9
Reactive resolution strategies are even less effective for sovereign debt than
for corporate debt because sovereigns lack systematic legal mechanisms—
NEWS (Jul. 11, 2011, 12:39 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/eurozone-seeks-to-stop-de
bt-crisis-domino-effect/ [https://perma.cc/XJ7K-5VXK] (highlighting the concern of a
domino effect resulting from a debt crisis in the Eurozone).
4. IMF, Macroeconomic Developments and Prospects in Low-Income Developing
Countries 35 (Mark Flanagan et al. eds., 2018), https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publicati
ons/PP/2018/pp021518-macroeconomic-developments-and-prospects-in-low-income-develo
ping-countries.ashx [https://perma.cc/4AEJ-NSYF].
5. Id. at 42. The International Monetary Fund defines a country as being in “debt
distress” when “a) the most recent DSA [debt sustainability assessment] yields an assessment
of ‘in debt distress’ or b) [the country has] defaulted on sizeable payments for a sustained
period since the most recent DSA.” Id. at n.29.
6. Id. at 43.
7. Steven L. Schwarcz, Beyond Bankruptcy: Resolution as a Macroprudential
Regulatory Tool, 94 NOTREDAME L. REV. 709 (2018) [hereinafter Beyond Bankruptcy].
8. See id. at 716–21 (noting the avenues available for a failing firm).
9. See, e.g., Marco Committeri & Francesco Spadafora, You Never Give Me Your
Money? Sovereign Debt Crises, Collective Action Problems, and IMF Lending 35, 37 (IMF,
Working Paper 13/20, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1320.pdf [http
s://perma.cc/AQ5X-MMWD] (observing that the official response to European debt crises
has been largely reactive); Guillermo de la Dehesa, Spain and the Euro Area Sovereign Debt
Crisis 5 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. and Bruegel, 2011), https://piie.com/publications/pape
rs/dehesa20110913.pdf [https://perma.cc/PE5U-LJ6D] (“Today, it is clear that the building
up of the euro area sovereign debt crisis has been mainly due to . . . governments being first
in denial and later reacting too late with too little, while dragging their feet and being always
behind the curve.”).
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such as those provided by corporate bankruptcy law
10
—for correcting
collective action holdout problems and other market failures that impede
debt restructuring.
11
Nor are such mechanisms likely to be implemented in
the foreseeable future.
12
Waiting until a sovereign becomes financially
troubled to restructure its debt is also problematic because the sovereign’s
loss of access to low-cost capital markets can exacerbate its debt burden.
13
The ongoing drama of Greece’s debt restructuring, which already
involves the largest sovereign bailout in history, illustrates these
inefficiencies. That nation has been using billions of euros of bailout funds
solely to pay interest on, without actually reducing, the principal amount of
its debt.
14
Furthermore, a portion of that bailout funding is conditioned on
Greece taking certain creditor-imposed austerity measures, which may be
benefitting its creditors more than the nation.
15
Changes in the sovereign debt markets are making proactive resolution
even more important. Diversification of the types of creditors holding
sovereign debt, for example, is creating uncertainty as to relative creditor
priorities, further impeding the ability of parties to restructure unsustainable
10. Cf. Beyond Bankruptcy, supra note 7, at 104 (discussing those legal mechanisms,
including the supermajority voting of 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c)).
11. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Model-Law Approach, 6 J.
GLOBALIZATION & DEV. 343, 344–45 (2016) (discussing the collective action holdout
problem). A holdout problem occurs when one or more creditors refuse to agree to a
restructuring plan that requires their consent, unless they obtain a disproportionately greater
share of the plan’s benefits. Id. To attempt to solve this problem, multilateral bodies have
advocated including collective action clauses (“CAC”s), which would bind holdouts to a
specified supermajority’s will, in sovereign debt contracts. Id. To date, however, the use of
CACs has not solved the problem of unsustainable sovereign debt. Id. See also JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ & DANIEL HEYMANN, LIFE AFTER DEBT: THE ORIGINS AND RESOLUTIONS OF DEBT
CRISIS 206 (2010) (introducing the model CAC in Euro area).
12. Cf. Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36
GEO. J. INT’L L. 300, 340 (2005) (arguing that the International Monetary Fund’s proposed
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) failed to gain widespread sovereign
support because it required sovereigns to cede some immunity and faced other political and
social constraints).
13. International Monetary Fund, Sovereign Debt Restructuring—Recent Developments
and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework 16 (2013), http://www.imf.or
g/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Sovereign-Debt-Restructuring-Recent-
Developments-and-Implications-for-the-Fund-s-Legal-and-PP4772 [https://perma.cc/Y62Q-
FN88] [hereinafter “IMF”].
14. Kimberly Amadeo, Greek Debt Crisis Explained, THE BALANCE (Jan. 25, 2019), htt
ps://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-greece-debt-crisis-3305525 [https://perma.cc/5786-G
LRC].
15. Id.
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debt.
16
The growth of collateralized sovereign debt also “reduces room for
maneuver in the event of a crisis, making [debt] restructurings more
difficult.”
17
Recent defaults by the Venezuela government and PDVSA
(Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A., Venezuela’s state-owned oil company)
highlight these changes. The diversified nature of their creditors has created
uncertainty as to the relative seniority of their claims,
18
and the fact that a
large portion of Venezuelan assets is located outside that country has made
it easier for creditors to seize collateral.
19
These factors further undermine
the ability to reach a successful debt restructuring.
This Article also examines the proactive resolution of unsustainable
subnational debt—meaning the debt of political subdivisions of nations, such
as states, provinces, and municipalities.
20
The World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) recognize the increasing urgency of
subnational debt problems.
21
Unsustainable subnational debt sometimes also
contributes to sovereign debt burdens; the inability of the Provinces of
Mendoza and Buenos Aires to pay their debt, for example, appears to have
been a major factor in Argentina’s 2001 debt default.
22
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I conceives and designs an
16. Hugh Bredenkamp et al., Challenges Ahead, IMF 22 (IMF, 2018), https://www.imf.o
rg/~/media/Files/News/Seminars/2018/091318SovDebt-conference/chapter-9-challenges-
ahead.ashx?la=en [https://perma.cc/2QHD-WLRN].
17. Id. at 6. The growth in collateralized debts is one example of debtors’ attempt to
create “restructuring resistant” contracts to lower borrowing cost. Id. at 7.
18. Mark A. Walker & Richard J. Cooper, Venezuela’s Restructuring: A Realistic
Framework 3, 27 (Sept 19, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039
678 [https://perma.cc/GBH3-7RP3].
19. Id. at 4. Also, most bonds issued by the Venezuela government contain collective
action clauses, whereas the PDVSA bonds do not, raising the question whether both types of
bonds should be restructured. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, How to Restructure
Venezuelan Debt 5–6 (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 2017-
52), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3006680 [https://perma.cc/S39Z-P
VJW] (describing legal aspects of PDVSA bonds).
20. Steven L. Schwarcz, Global Decentralization and the Subnational Debt Problem, 51
DUKE L. J. 1179, 1181 (2002) [hereinafter Subnational Debt Problem].
21. Mahesh Uttamchandani, Glob. Practice Manager, Fin. & Mkts., The World Bank
Grp., Statement at the UNCITRAL 50th Congress in Vienna, Austria (July 5, 2017). Cf. IMF,
Analyzing and Managing Fiscal Risks—Best Practices 40 (June 2016), https://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2016/050416.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LQT-9CWY] (“Liabilities of
subnational governments can be a source of fiscal risk. . . . Expectations of bailouts can
weaken market discipline and lead to excessive risk taking by subnational authorities”; and
also observing that “the fiscal costs of subnational bailouts averag[es] around 3.5 percent, of
GDP, per event”).
22. Lili Liu &Michael Waibel, Subnational Insolvency: Cross-Country Experiences and
Lessons 3 (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper, 2008), https://openknowledge
.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/6384/wps4496.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL9J-9M3H].
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analytical framework for proactively resolving government debt, to prevent
it from becoming unsustainable. Part II applies that framework to resolving
sovereign debt. Part III applies that framework to resolving subnational debt.
The Appendix briefly summarizes the resulting design recommendations,
following the Article’s more detailed discussion.
There are references throughout this Article to “unsustainable” debt.
Although the definition of unsustainability can be elusive in a government-
debt context, the following intuitive definition should suffice for analyzing
proactive resolution: government debt is unsustainable if the government
cannot continue paying principal and interest thereon and still be able to
provide critical public services. This definition roughly follows the more
technical definition used by the International Monetary Fund, which views
government debt as unsustainable if the government is not expected to be
able to continue paying principal and interest on its debt given its current
levels of income and expenditures.
23
Because they are examined at length in other literature, certain routine
debt practices that some might consider proactive are beyond this Article’s
scope. These include investing the proceeds of borrowings to try to generate
a sufficient return for repayment (analytically, this Article assumes that some
nations, like some companies, inevitably will face unsustainable debt
burdens); the actions of the IMF as a lender of last resort to governments
24
;
and the longstanding dialogue about creating forums to try to facilitate
sovereign-debt-restructuring conversations.
25
Also, the Article does not
purport to try to solve the “rollover risk” of short-term government debt—
that a government will be temporarily unable to borrow sufficient funds to
repay its maturing debt.
26
Even proactive resolution strategies may be unable
23. See IMF, Assessing Sustainability 4–5 (May 2002), https://www.imf.org/external/np
/pdr/sus/2002/eng/052802.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2DD-DAAJ] (taking into account liquidity
and governmental equivalents to solvency, as well as various indicators of the government’s
debt size, economic and political status and development, and predictions of future market
conditions).
24. See, e.g., Umberto Schwarz, The International Monetary Fund as International
Lender of Last Resort, Swiss Nat’l Bank, Q.BULLETIN, Mar. 2002, at 64 (discussing the IMF’s
limited resources and limited ability to extend credit).
25. See, e.g., Richard Gitlin & Brett House, A Blueprint for a Sovereign Debt Forum
(CIGI, Paper No. 27, 2014) (proposing the establishment of an international forum to facilitate
debt-restructuring conversations between sovereign debtors and creditors); Gong Cheng &
Javier Díaz-Cassou, Official Debt Restructurings and Development (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Dallas, Working Paper No. 339, 2018) (discussing the Paris Club as a coordinator among
bilateral creditors).
26. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rollover Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default, 55 B.C. L.REV.
1 (2014) (discussing the government’s inability to secure additional financing to pay off
maturing debt).
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to control that risk.
27
I. DESIGNING A PROACTIVE-RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK
Conceptually, there are at least two proactive strategies for preventing
debt from becoming unsustainable: convert borderline unsustainable debt
28
into sustainable financing, through pre-planning, or try to prevent the debt
from approaching unsustainability.
29
Although only conversion involves
“resolution” in the strict sense of a debt restructuring, discussions of
resolving corporate debt often include both methodologies.
30
This Article
adopts that broader usage for discussing the proactive resolution of
government debt.
31
Subpart A next analyzes how to preplan the conversion of government
debt that becomes borderline unsustainable debt into sustainable financing
(such preplanned debt is hereinafter referred to as “convertible financing”).
Thereafter, Subpart B analyzes how to design government debt to try to
prevent it from approaching unsustainability.
27. Cf. Luncheon speech of Lee C. Buchheit at an Imperial College, London conference
on sovereign debt restructuring, sponsored by its Brevan Howard Centre for Financial
Analysis, the Initiative on Global Markets of the University of Chicago Booth School of
Business, and the International Insolvency Institute (Mar. 27, 2015) (explaining the dangers
of rollover risk).
28. Recall this refers to debt that is beginning to become unsustainable. Supra notes 7–
8 and accompanying text.
29. Supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Wojciech Maliszewski, et al., Resolving China’s Corporate Debt Problem
(IMF Working Paper 16/203, 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp1620
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/HAQ6-AFDL] (providing proactive debt resolution strategies for non-
performing loans, such as debt-equity conversions and ways to design sustainable debt
products, including the removal of guarantees from the government to prevent moral hazard).
31. In Beyond Bankruptcy, supra note 7, at 727 n.121, I suggested an intuitive way to
distinguish these proactive strategies by considering the colloquial reference to a firm going
into bankruptcy as the “sh-t” hitting the fan. Cf. URBANDICTIONARY, http://www.urbandicti
onary.com/define.php?term=shit%20hits%20the%20fan [https://perma.cc/RM6C-PT5C]
(defining that as “the point at which an already unstable situation devolves into utter chaos”).
Reactive resolution-based regulation would try to clean up the mess once the sh-t hits the fan
(analogous to reorganization). Proactive resolution-based regulation either would try to
prevent the sh-t, once thrown, from actually hitting the fan, or would try to prevent the sh-t
from ever being thrown at the fan (although that latter approach could also be deemed
counteractive).
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A. Converting Borderline Unsustainable Debt into Sustainable
Financing
Proactive resolution using convertible financing would differ in two
ways from traditional debt restructuring. Whereas traditional debt
restructuring is intended to convert unsustainable debt into sustainable
financing, convertible financing is intended to convert borderline
unsustainable debt into sustainable financing. Furthermore, convertible
financing is intended to do that through pre-planning, based on provisions
included in the contract governing the debt.
32
Convertible financing also should be distinguished from so-called
State-Contingent Debt Instruments (SCDIs), a less precise category of
proactive resolution recently discussed in an IMF policy paper.
33
The SCDI
category lumps together certain types of convertible financing, such as
government bonds that have conversion triggers for natural disasters, and
also certain types of what this Article later calls variable financing,
34
such as
government bonds with principal, interest, and/or maturities linked to pre-
defined variables, such as commodity prices.
35
In contrast, this Article’s
categories of proactive resolution are more consistent with the modes of
proactive resolution for corporate debt
36
as well as more precise and more
comprehensive—for example, including non-recourse financing
37
—about
the ways that proactive resolution can work.
38
In response to the global financial crisis of 2008, convertible financing
is beginning to be used in the corporate sector to help systemically important
financial firms resolve unsustainable debt. To that end, regulators have
started requiring such firms to issue some portion of their debt as convertible
32. Cf. infra note 175 (discussing legislative alternatives to contractually implementing
proactive resolution).
33. IMF, State-Contingent Debt Instruments for Sovereigns 1 (IMF Policy Paper, May
2017), https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/PP/pp032317state-contingent-debt-i
nstruments-for-sovereigns.ashx [https://perma.cc/NKH4-AVT3].
34. See infra text accompanying notes 45–46 (describing variable financing).
35. IMF, supra note 33.
36. Beyond Bankruptcy, supra note 7, at 721–26 (discussing how proactive resolution
seeks to help systemically important firms avoid default).
37. The SCDI category does not include non-recourse financing, discussed infra Part
I.B.2.
38. IMF, supra note 33, at 5, 7–8. As a rough correlation, though, convertible financing
has certain parallels to what the SCDI category includes as “discrete adjustment” funding, and
variable financing has certain parallels to what the SCDI category includes as “continuous
adjustment” funding.
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financing in the form of contingent convertible bonds (“CoCos”).
39
CoCos
are designed to convert from debt to equity securities upon the occurrence of
pre-specified triggers, which often are accounting-based, indicating the
issuer of the debt is becoming financially troubled.
40
Conversion would
reduce the firm’s indebtedness with the intention of making the firm
financially viable again.
41
For example, $100 million of CoCos might be
designed to convert from debt claims into common stock, an equity interest,
if a firm’s net worth drops below $10 million. “The possibility that their
debt claims could be converted into equity should also motivate [investors
in CoCos] to take on more of a ‘monitoring’ role by imposing stricter
covenants, which could reduce the firm’s risk-taking.”
42
Common sense and the limited experience with CoCos reveal two
issues that are integral to designing convertible financing: what should
trigger conversion, and into what should the debt convert? As will be shown,
these issues should be addressed differently not only for governmental and
corporate debtors—governments cannot feasibly issue “equity” securities
representing ownership interests therein—but also for sovereign and
subnational debtors.
43
Convertible financing also raises marketability issues
due to their inherent conversion risk, which can make corporate CoCos
unattractive for some institutional investors.
44
The economic viability of
convertible government financing will turn on the risk premium needed to
attract investors.
45
39. Ceyla Pazarbasioglu et al., Contingent Capital: Economic Rationale and Design
Features 4 (IMF Staff Discussion Note No. 11/01, 2011), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs
/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1101.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QC9-AFMC]. See also Beyond Bankruptcy,
supra note 7, at 722 (discussing the conversion of debt to equity approach for systemically
important firms).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 4–5. Some have suggested, however, that the conversion of corporate CoCos
to equity might jeopardize the financial integrity of institutional investors in the CoCos,
thereby indirectly increasing systemic risk. See, e.g., Emilios Avgouleas &Charles Goodhart,
Bank Resolution a Decade After the Global Financial Crisis: A Systematic Reappraisal, in
SYSTEMICRISK IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: TENYEARSAFTER THEGREATCRASH (Douglas W.
Arner, Emilios Avgouleas, Danny Busch & Steven L. Schwarcz eds., 2019).
42. Beyond Bankruptcy, supra note 7, at 722.
43. See infra notes 73–83 and accompanying text (discussing issues related to convertible
financing).
44. Martin Brooke, Rhys Mendes, Alex Pienkowski & Eric Santor, Sovereign Default
and State-Contingent Debt 10 (Bank of Canada Discussion Paper No. 2013-3, 2013), http://w
ww.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/dp2013-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XQY-
ABY8].
45. See infra notes 103–104 and accompanying text (discussing how the risk premium
might make such bonds unmarketable). Certain secondary factors might also be relevant in
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B. Preventing Debt Burdens from Approaching Unsustainability
There are at least two ways to try to prevent debt financing from
approaching unsustainability. The first, examined below in Subpart 1, is to
tie the amounts and/or maturities of payments on the debt to factors liable to
change, or variables, that correspond to the debtor’s ability to pay (“variable
financing”). The second, examined below in Subpart 2, is to limit recourse
on the debt to only specified assets or revenue sources of the debtor (“non-
recourse financing”).
1. Variable Financing
As mentioned, variable financing would tie the amounts and/or
maturities of payments on the debt to variables corresponding to the
government’s ability to pay.
46
The variables could be the government’s
GDP
47
or other factors linked to the government’s creditworthiness such as
its commodity-export prices.
48
Economist Robert Shiller first proposed a
form of variable government financing, which would index interest
payments to a nation’s GDP.
49
References to GDP-linked bonds more
commonly today mean bonds that adjust not only interest but also,
considering the economics of convertible as well as variable government financing. For
example, if investors suspect that a government issues such financing because it is concerned
over its economic future, they may demand even higher compensation. Cf. IMF, supra note
33, at 13 (discussing adverse selection, but observing that countries “in which fiscal
transparency is already high should be less subject to these concerns”). Furthermore, the
“possibility of paying high debt service in good times and receiving automatic debt relief in
bad times can reduce [a government’s] incentives to keep vulnerabilities at bay.” IMF, supra
note 33, at 13 (discussing moral hazard, but observing several “possible mitigating factors”).
46. Cf. GREGORYMAKOFF, GDP-INDEXED BONDS: AWAY FORWARD (2017), https://ww
w.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Policy%20Brief%20No.97web.pdf [https://pe
rma.cc/FC9H-C3UK] (discussing variable financing tying interest rate (which he calls
coupon-indexed bonds), principal amounts (which he calls principal-indexed bonds), or
both—depending on the government’s financial stability goals—to a variable such as GDP).
47. Eduardo Borensztein & Paolo Mauro, The Case for GDP-Indexed Bonds, 19 ECON.
POL’Y 165, 169–70 (2004).
48. Id. at 170.
49. ROBERT SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR MANAGING
SOCIETY’S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS 52–53 (1993). Government bonds that link their
interest payments to GDP have been called “trills.” Mark Kamstra & Robert J. Shiller, The
Case for Trills: Giving the People and Their Pension Funds a Stake in the Wealth of the
Nation 3 (Cowles Foundation, Discussion Paper No. 1717, 2009), http://cowles.econ.yale.ed
u/sites/default/files/files/pub/d17/d1717.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D2H-585S].
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potentially, principal amounts and maturities according to changes in GDP.
50
Shiller,
51
and later other scholars
52
as well as Bank of England
economists,
53
have argued that GDP-linked bonds would reduce the
likelihood of sovereign debt crises. The G20 has called for further analysis
of such bonds.
54
In practice, however, no nation has yet issued GDP-linked
bonds (although I later discuss a limited example set by the issuance of GDP-
linked warrants
55
).
Nor does the corporate sector offer a clear precedent for variable
financing. The closest functional equivalent would appear to be preferred-
stock equity financing, under which shareholders normally receive payment
of fixed dividends, but management may decide to decrease or suspend those
payments if the issuer is in financial distress.
56
The fact that there is strong
investor interest in preferred-stock equity financing—as of June 30, 2015,
for example, the “market size of publicly traded preferred shares in the U.S.
50. See, e.g., Borensztein & Mauro, supra note 47, at 169–70 (discussing how GDP-
linked bonds can lead to lower debt payments when GDP growth stalls); Yannis Manuelides,
GDP-linked Bonds: A Commentary on a Term Sheet, 12 CAPITALMARKETS L.J. 125, 129–30
(2017) (discussing the impact of GDP-linked bonds on maturity dates of bonds).
51. SHILLER, supra note 49, at 52–54.
52. See, e.g., Bruno Cabrillac, Ludovic Gauvin & Jean Baptiste Gosse, Benefits of GDP-
indexed Bonds for Issuing Countries, Investors and International Financial Stability, CTR.
FOR ECON. POL’Y RES. (Mar. 7, 2017), https://voxeu.org/article/benefits-gdp-indexed-bonds
(summarizing a wide array of benefits from issuing GDP-linked bonds such as the ability of
developing countries to issue bonds in their own currency); Olivier Blanchard, Paola Mauro
& Julien Acalin, The Case for Growth-indexed Bonds in Advanced Economies Today, CTR.
FOR ECON. POL’Y RES. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://voxeu.org/article/case-growth-indexed-bonds
[https://perma.cc/TV9Q-QCCB] (observing that GDP-indexed bonds would not only be
countercyclical but also allow investors to share in GDP gains).
53. See JAMESBENFORD ET AL., SOVEREIGNGDP-LINKEDBONDS 5 (2016), http://www.b
ankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper39.pdf [https://perma
.cc/L2PF-SA3X] (arguing that GDP-linked bonds would reduce the likelihood of a sovereign
debt crisis).
54. See, e.g., GDP-linked Bonds: One of the Greatest Innovations in Sovereign Debt in
Modern Times?, ALLEN&OVERY (Mar. 16, 2018), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/
en-gb/Pages/GDP-linked-bonds-one-of-the-greatest-innovations-in-sovereign-debt-in-moder
n-times.aspx [https://perma.cc/RA5M-SFVT] (describing how the GDP-linked sovereign
bond project has the support and endorsement of the G20 and other organizations).
55. See infra notes 96–102 and accompanying text (discussing the issuance of GDP-
linked warrants by various sovereigns).
56. Michael L. Hartzmark & H. Nejat Seyhun, Understanding the Efficiency of the
Market for Preferred Stock, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 149, 162 (2014). Common stock is not
analogous to variable corporate financing because it gives investors voting control over
choosing the issuer’s management and also because issuers are not normally required to pay
dividends to investors. See, e.g., Michael A. Woronoff & Jonathan A. Rosen, Understanding
Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 129 (2005)
(explaining how preferred stock is different from common stock).
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[alone] was estimated to be USD 241 billion”
57
—hints that investors might
also be interested in variable government financing.
In the abstract, though, it is hard to predict how strong that interest will
be. Although both corporate managers and government officials might have
an incentive to underreport issuer income to reduce payments on variable
financing,
58
holders of preferred stock normally have the right to replace one
or more directors if payments are missed.
59
Ideally, variable government
financing similarly should be designed with protection for underreporting. It
also may be harder to ascertain underreporting in a government than a
corporate context. Unlike corporations, governments are not subject to
generally accepted accounting principles. Furthermore, GDP, the standard
measure of sovereign government income, has been criticized for being an
imprecise measure of a nation’s income.
60
Government financial
transparency is thus much lower than that of corporations.
61
The future market viability of variable government financing also will
turn on its cost. Investors would be expected to demand compensation for
the additional repayment risk.
62
For traditional debt, an issuer’s default risk
would increase when its revenues decrease. For variable financing, however,
investors not only would face that increased default risk but also might
57. PHILLIPBRZENK&AYEM.SOE, S&PDOW JONES INDICES, DIGGINGDEEPER INTO THE
U.S. PREFERREDMARKET 2 (Oct. 2015), https://us.spindices.com/documents/research/researc
h-digging-deeper-into-the-us-preferred-market.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AMD-U2Y5].
58. Although such underreporting would likely violate their contractual obligation to
holders of that debt, corporate managers do not owe bondholders a fiduciary duty. George S.
Corey, Are Bondholders Owed a Fiduciary Duty?, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 971, 975 (1991).
Nonetheless, underreporting earnings may well violate management’s duty to shareholders,
if it lowers stock price.
59. See Hartzmark & Seyhun, supra note 56, at 162 (discussing the characteristics of
preferred stock).
60. See, e.g., Robert Costanza et al., Beyond GDP: The Need for New Measures of
Progress, THE PARDEE PAPERS, Jan. 2009, at 8–9 (observing that “GDP measures only
monetary transactions related to production of goods and services” and “ignores changes in
natural, social and human components”). Cf. infra notes 105–107 and accompanying text
(discussing the unreliability of GDP as a measure of government income).
61. Cf. Rob Arnott, Does Unreal GDP Drive Our Policy Choices, FUNDAMENTAL INDEX
NEWSL., Apr. 2011, at 3 (“Our debt/GDP ratio may be poised to cross 100% of GDP this fall,
but our GAAP accounting debt burden is already well past 400% of GDP and well past 500%
of Structural GDP.”).
62. ING-CHEA ANG, UNDERSTANDING THE VOLATILITY RISK PREMIUM, AQR CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT (2018), https://www.aqr.com/Insights/Research/White-Papers/Understanding
-the-Volatility-Risk-Premium [https://perma.cc/M4WC-MX5D] (calling the repayment risk
“volatility” risk). Preferred stock would not be as subject to this repayment risk because the
right of its holders to replace one or more directors discourages management from reducing
or suspending dividend payments. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (detailing the
advantages of preferred stock).
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receive reduced payments on the debt when revenues decrease.
63
2. Non-Recourse Financing
Financing under which creditors have recourse solely to specified assets
or revenue sources of a debtor is said to be “non-recourse” to the debtor’s
assets and revenues generally.
64
The fundamental distinction between non-
recourse financing and variable financing is that the former encompasses
debt whose payments derive from specific limited sources, whereas the latter
encompasses debt with full recourse to the debtor but whose amounts and
maturities can change depending on the variables chosen.
Non-recourse financing—especially when done through special
purpose entities (“SPE”s) specifically created to engage in the financing—is
very common in corporate finance and is widely accepted by investors.
65
It
is used, for example, in securitization, project finance, and other forms of
monetizing financial assets.
66
Non-recourse financing can increase
economic efficiency by more precisely allocating risks and rewards between
debtors and creditors, thereby reducing information asymmetry.
67
When
misused, however, non-recourse financing can increase information
asymmetry, such as by facilitating opaque off-balance-sheet financing.
68
Non-recourse government financing has significant precedent in some
63. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (tying the amounts and/or maturities of
payments on variable financing to factors corresponding to the issuer’s ability to pay).
64. Although a more intuitive term might be limited-recourse financing, this Article’s
use of non-recourse financing follows the generally accepted market term.
65. See, e.g., Lydia C. Stefanowicz, Non-recourse Loans – A Dangerous Misnomer, 342
N.J. ST. B. ASS’N BUS. L. SEC. 4, 4–6 (Feb. 2016) (discussing the commonality of non-
recourse loans and SPE usage in lending).
66. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities in Public
Finance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 369 (2012) (discussing those risks) [hereinafter “Special-Purpose
Entities in Public Finance”]; cf. Cheryl D. Block, Congress and the Accounting Scandals: Is
the Pot Calling the Kettle Black?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 365, 435–42 (2003) (identifying the
problem of national SPEs); Jonathan Rosenbloom, Can a Private Corporate Analysis of
Public Authority Administration Lead to Democracy, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 851 (2005-
2006) (raising normative questions about state SPEs).
67. See, e.g., Katherine J. Baudistel, Bankruptcy-Remote Special Purpose Entities: An
Opportunity for Investors to Maximize the Value of Their Returns While Undergoing More
Careful and Realistic Risk Analysis, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1314 (2013) (describing how
special purpose entities allocate risk). This Article does not purport to address all ways to
allocate risks, which include default insurance, CDS, senior-subordinated structures, and
government guarantees.
68. Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 66 (discussing that misuse).
Cf. Block, supra note 66, at 439–42 (comparing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Enron’s use
of SPEs to hide certain investments “off-balance sheet”).
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jurisdictions, such as the United States.
69
The key is that investors have
recourse to a “sufficiently reliable and adequate source of repayment” such
as “high-quality financial assets—i.e., assets that are expected to convert to
cash.”
70
In both a sovereign and a subnational government context, this
might include payments expected to be generated from an income-producing
project or rights to the future payment of specified tax revenues.
71
II. PROACTIVERESOLUTION OF SOVEREIGNDEBT
Having designed a generalized framework for proactively resolving
government debt, this Part II applies the framework to sovereign debt, first
addressing convertible financing, next addressing variable financing, and
finally addressing non-recourse financing. Thereafter, Part III applies the
framework to subnational debt, addressing convertible, variable, and then
non-recourse financing in that same order.
A. Convertible Financing
As mentioned, two issues are integral to designing convertible
financing for sovereign debt. The first, discussed in Subpart 1 below, is what
should trigger conversion. The second issue, discussed in Subpart 2 below,
is into what should the debt then convert. As will be shown, these issues are
very different for sovereigns than for corporations.
72
Subparts 3 and 4
discuss additional issues: whether the convertible financing will be
economically viable, and whether the conversion itself could have harmful
consequences.
1. What Should Trigger Conversion?
Convertible financing would have to work differently for sovereigns
than for corporations because sovereigns lack obvious financial accounting
triggers, such as insolvency, that signal unsustainability. Although some
have suggested that a debt-to-GDP ratio might work as a conversion
69. See Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 66, at 374–75 (listing
prominent examples of non-recourse government financing in the United States).
70. Steven L. Schwarcz, Bypassing Congress on Federal Debt: Executive Branch
Options to Avoid Default, 31 YALE J. ONREG. 269, 286–87 (2014).
71. Id. at 287 (cautioning that any such specified tax revenues should be a finite set whose
value would not so greatly exceed the amount of the financing that someone could call into
question whether the transaction is truly nonrecourse).
72. See infra notes 73–81 and accompanying text (explaining why sovereign debt has
unique characteristics from that of corporate debt).
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trigger,
73
GDP is difficult to measure and, if calculated by the sovereign
itself, can be unreliable.
74
Amore sensible alternative trigger might be based
on multilateral action, such as a sovereign debtor receiving emergency
financial assistance from the IMF or the European Stability Mechanism
(“ESM”).
75
2. Into What Should the Debt Convert?
Again, convertible financing would have to work differently for
sovereigns than for corporations—in this instance, because sovereigns
cannot feasibly convert their debt into equity ownership in the nation.
Instead, sovereign convertible financing could convert into debt whose
principal and/or interest rate are reduced, or whose maturities are extended,
to try to make the debt sustainable.
In the context of SCDIs,
76
the IMF and the ESM have focused on using
so-called automatic maturity extensions (AMEs) to extend maturities of
sovereign debt.
77
Extending maturities would address liquidity
78
—the
government’s ability to pay its debts as they come due.
79
Convertible
financing agreements could include AME-type provisions, either
automatically extending maturities upon the occurrence of a trigger event
80
73. Ashoka Mody, Sovereign Debt and Its Restructuring Framework in the Eurozone, 30
OXFORDREV. ECON. POL’Y 715, 737 (2013); cf. Brooke et al., supra note 44, at 8 (suggesting
trigger events including a decrease in the GDP-to-debt ratio).
74. See infra notes 105–111 and accompanying text (explaining the pitfalls to GDP-
linked sovereign debt).
75. BENFORD ET AL., supra note 53, at 5.
76. Cf. supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text (comparing convertible financing and
SCDIs).
77. IMF, supra note 23, at 39. See also Jochen Andritzky et al., AMechanism to Regulate
Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Euro Area (German Council of Economic Experts,
Working Paper 04/2016, 2016) (providing a debt restructuring framework that includes an
automatic maturity extension).
78. Principal reductions, in contrast, would address solvency, which the IMF describes
as meaning that the present discounted value (PDV) of the government’s current and future
primary expenditure is greater than the PDV of its current and future income, net of any initial
indebtedness. IMF, supra note 23, at 39; cf. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (2012) (defining an entity
as being insolvent when the sum of its debts is greater than all of its property, at a fair
valuation, exclusive of the transferred, concealed, removed or exempted property).
79. See, e.g., Atif R. Mian& João A.C. Santos, Liquidity Risk, andMaturity Management
over the Business Cycle, 127 J. FIN. ECON. 2 (2018) (discussing the use of maturity extensions
to reduce liquidity risk).
80. Brooke et al., supra note 44, at 8. The ESM’s proposal defines the trigger event for
an AME as the government’s receipt of ESM funds.
224 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 22:1
or giving the issuer the option to extend maturities upon that occurrence.
81
They also could include, of course, similar provisions either automatically
reducing principal and/or interest rate, or giving the issuer the option to make
those reductions, upon the occurrence of a trigger event.
Ultimately, answering what convertible financing should convert into
will turn on at least two considerations: what type of conversion would best
make the particular government’s debt sustainable, and how would the
conversion options affect the financing cost. The first consideration is
government-specific and thus beyond this Article’s scope, other than to
observe that—cost being equal—a government that is concerned about its
liquidity might favor extending maturities whereas a government that is
concerned about its solvency might favor reducing principal. Both might
also consider reducing the interest rate, which would help liquidity by
reducing monthly interest payments and also help solvency by reducing the
total payments on the debt. The other consideration—how the conversion
options will affect the financing cost—is next discussed in Subpart 3.
3. Will the Convertible Financing Be Economically Viable?
The future market viability of convertible government financing will
turn primarily on its cost: Will governments be willing to pay the interest
premium demanded by investors to extend that financing?
82
That is an
empirical question that cannot be answered in the abstract. Convertible
financing that only extends maturities might, other things being equal, be
less expensive to issue than convertible financing that reduces principal. The
rationale is that, so long as the issuer pays a market rate of interest, extending
maturities would not necessarily reduce the present value of a creditor’s
recovery.
83
Reducing principal, however, necessarily would introduce
81. IMF, supra note 33, at 35.
82. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text (discussing the factors that influence
risk premiums).
83. Brooke et al., supra note 44, at 9. Gregory Makoff has suggested to the author that
long-term financing that is periodically callable may be a practical alternative to convertible
financing that extends maturities. The impact on sustainability could be designed to be
roughly comparable, allowing the government to choose from time to time whether to redeem
(i.e., prepay) the debt or let it continue. Although periodically callable long-term financing
would be simpler than convertible financing—avoiding the need to define a conversion
trigger, such as GDP—it would give the government control over the maturity; and callable
financing also is generally more expensive than non-callable financing. Nonetheless, the fact
that callable financing is a well-established market product indicates it still may be less
expensive than custom-designed convertible financing. Telephone Interview with Gregory
Makoff, Senior Fellow, Glob. Econ. Program, Ctr. for Int’l Governance Innovation (July 10,
2019).
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additional repayment risk for which investors would be expected to demand
additional compensation.
84
4. Could the Conversion Itself Have Harmful Consequences?
A final issue is whether the debt conversion itself could have harmful
consequences. For example, the investors could be systemically important,
such as large banks or pension funds, which could incur significant losses
upon conversion.
85
Debt conversion then might trigger systemic financial
contagion.
86
Although there may be no perfect solution to this concern,
possible second-best solutions might include limiting the amount of
convertible government financing in which a systemically important firm
would be allowed to invest.
87
B. Variable Financing
Next consider using variable financing to proactively resolve sovereign
debt to avoid its becoming unsustainable. In contrast to convertible
financing, the payment terms of variable financing would not convert;
instead, they would be linked to variables corresponding to the government’s
ability to pay, such as its GDP or commodity-export prices.
88
GDP-linked
bonds are the most commonly discussed example of variable sovereign
84. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text (discussing strategies for mitigating
repayment risk, which is tied to the issuer’s ability to pay).
85. Cf. Neel Kashkari, New Bailouts Prove “Too Big to Fail” Is Alive and Well, WALL
ST. J. (July 9, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-bailouts-prove-too-big-to-fail-is-aliv
e-and-well-1499638636 [https://perma.cc/A9KH-F2WR] (observing that the Italian
government decided to bail out a non-systemically important bank rather than trigger the
conversion because the bondholders were retail investors).
86. Id.
87. Cf. IMF, supra note 33, at 14–15 (observing that the risk of financial contagion from
debt conversion “would be less of a concern where the volume of [convertible financing]
issued is small in relation to” the investors’ balance sheets, and also noting that “this issue
highlights the importance of . . . design considerations (such as caps and floors) that limit the
size of potential losses for investors”). These limitations should take into account both the
amount of a particular government’s convertible financing and also, to protect against possible
unforeseen correlations in government debt problems, the aggregate amount of all
government convertible financing. Bank lending limits, which restrict the amount of bank
exposure to any given customer’s risk, could provide a regulatory precedent for imposing
these types of limitations. See, e.g., Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design
Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 323, 370 (2007) (discussing how hedge funds are subject to
few limitations regarding their potential risk exposure).
88. Supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
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financing.
89
No country has yet issued bonds linked to these types of variables.
90
Certain nations, however, have issued warrants linked to GDP or
commodity-export prices. In this context, warrants refer to securities that
entitle the holder to certain rights as a “sweetener” to enhance the
attractiveness of a sovereign bond exchange.
The first example occurred in 1989. After many Latin American
countries defaulted on their bank loans, U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas
Brady arranged for the banks to exchange their loans for bonds (nicknamed
“Brady Bonds”) issued by those countries, effectively with U.S. government
backing.
91
The Brady Bonds had reduced interest rates and extended
payment maturities (typically 25-30 years), which were intended to enable
the countries to pay their restructured debt.
92
So far, that represents a
traditional debt restructuring.
93
Certain of the Brady bonds, however, were issued with separately
tradable Value Recovery Rights (“VRR”s), which provided for payments
indexed to the price of the sovereign’s export commodities,
94
such as oil.
95
The VRRs narrowly represented a form of variable financing insofar as their
payments were linked to the price of export commodities. In reality, though,
the VRRs did not actually represent a proactive resolution strategy; they did
89. Supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text.
90. See IMF, supra note 33, at 16 (observing that, “[t]o date, sovereigns have not used
[contingent or variable financing] as a regular instrument of budget financing”).
91. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit, The Background to Brady’s Initiative, 9 INT’LFIN. L. REV.
29, 30 (1990) (explaining the history and main features of Brady Bonds); Ross P. Buckley,
The Transformative Potential of a Secondary Market: Emerging Markets Debt Trading from
1983 to 1989, 21FORDHAM INT’LL.J. 1152, 1152 (1998) (tracing the development of the Latin
American debt market); Philip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary
Market and its Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 2720–21
(1996) (detailing the mechanics of Brady Bonds). The Brady Bond trade allowed those banks
not to have to write off their loans as non-performing. J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RES. SERV.,
RL30348, ECUADOR’SBRADYBONDDEFAULT: BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS (2000).
92. FED. RESERVE, SEC. 4255.1, TRADING CAPITAL MARKETS AND ACTIVITIES MANUAL
(1998).
93. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (distinguishing traditional and proactive
resolution).
94. LEEC. BUCHHEIT&ELENA L. DALY, SOVEREIGNDEBTMANAGEMENT 10–11 (2014).
95. IMF, supra note 33, at 20. Venezuela, Nigeria, and Mexico issued VRRs linked to
oil prices, which provided investors contingent payments if the price of oil reached a pre-set
price—thereby enabling those investors to share in the upside of the issuer’s economic
recovery. IMF, supra note 33, at 20. Payments on commodity-linked securities also could
be linked to commodity-production revenues. Robert J. Myers, Incomplete Markets and
Commodity-Linked Finance in Developing Countries, 7 WORLDBANKRES. OBSERVER 79, 84
(1992). That would enable a nation to hedge against the risk, for example, that a commodity
price becomes high due to production failure which reduces the nation’s revenues. Id.
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not affect future payments due on the Brady Bonds themselves but were
merely a sweetener to encourage banks to enter into the loan-for-bond
exchange. Accordingly, the VRRs do not provide clear precedent for the
issuance of variable government financing as a proactive resolution strategy.
The other examples of variable sovereign financing were similarly
based on the issuance of warrants as sweeteners for bond exchanges. In
Argentina’s 2001-02 debt restructuring, for example, creditors exchanged
their existing bonds for a fractional amount of replacement bonds
96
plus, as
an incentive to facilitate the exchange, GDP-linked warrants that promised
additional payments if and when GDP targets were exceeded.
97
More
recently, Greece and Ukraine issued GDP-linked warrants as sweeteners to
help facilitate bond exchanges.
98
Because none of these warrants affected
future payments on the exchanged bonds, they (again) do not provide clear
precedent for the issuance of variable government financing as a proactive
resolution strategy.
These examples nonetheless might inform issues associated with
variable sovereign financing linked to GDP or commodity-export prices. As
a practical matter, for example, it appears that sovereigns take their variable
financing obligations seriously. By 2013, Argentina had paid approximately
U.S. $10 billion to holders of its GDP-linked warrants.
99
And sovereign
issuers repurchased most of their VRRs under call options in order to
forestall having to make even more expensive future payments.
100
Despite this limited success, “opinion remains strongly divided whether
[variable sovereign] bonds are viable and if investors would want to own
96. Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Haircuts: Estimating Investor Losses
in Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998-2005 63 (InternationalMonetary Fund, IMFWorking
Paper WP/05/137, July 2005) (reporting that bondholders took a 75 percent haircut).
97. The Republic of Arg. Prospectus (Form 424B5) (Jan. 10, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/914021/000095012305000302/y04567e424b5.htm [https://perma.cc/2U
7M-M3UW].
98. See, e.g., Stephen Park & Tim Samples, Ukraine’s Quietly Revolutionary Debt
Restructuring, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015, 11:49 AM), http://ft.com/content/d7656d33-874f-
30bf-b78e-3aa7b9d229e8 [https://perma.cc/SX44-XEL2] (analyzing the use of GDP-linked
value recovery instruments in Ukraine’s 2015 debt restructuring); Jeromin Zettelmeyer,
Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy 3, 10,
19 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 13-8, 2013), http://www.iie.com/public
ations/wp/wp13-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9DU-C2CD] (attributing part of the 97 percent
participation rate of Greece’s debt exchange to the inclusion of GDP-linked warrants).
99. Stephany Griffith-Jones &Dagmar Hertova,Growth-Linked Bonds, 11 CESIFODICE
REPORT 33, 36 (2013), http://policydialogue.org/files/publications/CESifo_DICE-Report_3-2
013_Griffith-JonesHertova_Final_draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/899A-KVEY] (calculating
payments on Argentine GDP-linked warrants).
100. FRANK J. FABOZZI & EFSTATHIA PILARINU, INVESTING IN EMERGING FIXED INCOME
MARKETS 13–14 (2008).
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them.”
101
There also is “significant uncertainty about how these instruments
would be priced and, therefore, the borrowing costs that would be faced by
governments.”
102
The risk premium alone might make such bonds
unmarketable, some argue, because governments “do not want to pay higher
returns when times are good”
103
and investors may not want to hold bonds
that would pay lower returns during a period of declining GDP.
104
Another obstacle to GDP-linked bonds is “that GDP is not an easy
economic indicator to measure.”
105
A nation’s GDP “tends to be constantly
revised, which would create additional uncertainty for an instrument that has
its coupon payments tied to this measure. In addition, investors need to be
confident that the statistics . . . are reliable.”
106
The Argentine GDP-linked
warrants, for example, “carried an extra premium because of the unreliability
of the [GDP] data.”
107
Some observers believe, however, that these types of measurement and
reliability concerns “could be mitigated if a respected independent body
monitored and enforced data integrity.”
108
The Greek and Ukrainian GDP-
linked warrants
109
provided, for example, for an independent source
of GDP data.
110
To further assure investors, Ukraine’s warrants mandated
arbitration for payment calculation disputes.
111
The future success of
variable financing linked to GDP may well depend, at least in part, on
101. Charlotte Moore, GDP-linked Sovereign Bonds: Would Investors Buy Them?, INV. &
PENSIONSEUR. (Apr. 2015), https://www.ipe.com/reports/gdp-linked-sovereign-bonds-would
-investors-buy-them/10007310.article [https://perma.cc/P366-BJPV]. Cf. Alex Pienkowski,
Debt Limits and the Structure of Public Debt (IMF, Working Paper No. 17/117, 2017)
(expressing uncertainty whether sovereigns would issue GDP-linked warrants as a primary
financing tool and whether investors would want to purchase them).
102. Joel Bowman & Phillip Naylor, GDP-Linked Bonds, RES. BANK AUSTL. BULLETIN
61, 61 (2016), https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2016/sep/pdf/rba-bulletin-2016-
09-gdp-linked-bonds.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XFE-B4J3].
103. Moore, supra note 101 (quoting Alex McKnight, investment manager at GAM
Holding AG, a Swiss global asset management firm).
104. Id. Cf. BENFORD ET AL., supra note 53, at 10–12, 18 (discussing the risk premium
that investors would demand, and observing that GDP-linked bonds will be unmarketable if
there is no intersection between that premium and what issuers are willing to pay).
105. Moore, supra note 101.
106. Id.
107. See id. (quoting Axel Botte, fixed income strategist at Natixis Asset Management).
Cf. IMF, supra note 33, at 13–14 (discussing the potential for “data manipulation”).
108. Brooke et al., supra note 44, at 15.
109. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining Greece’s and Ukraine’s use of
GDP-linked bonds).
110. See UKR., EXCHANGE OFFER MEMORANDUM 61–62 (2015), http://sites.dfkingltd
.com/ukraine/Home [https://perma.cc/T7CJ-S8FZ] (providing that “real GDP growth rate” is
based on the growth in Ukraine’s GDP as published in World Economic Outlook).
111. Id. at 68.
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producing reliable data.
C. Non-Recourse Financing
As discussed, most non-recourse financing is done through SPEs.
112
The U.S. federal government has a long history of using SPEs to achieve
government objectives.
113
Former vice president Al Gore even headed an
initiative entitled “Reinventing Government” that advocated for the
increased use of federal SPEs,
114
in order to “harness the efficiency of the
private sector for the service of the public . . . [thereby] combin[ing] the
flexibility of a business with the public purpose and public duties of
government.”
115
Some federal government SPEs are created as government
corporations, some as government-sponsored entities. Government
corporations are owned in whole or in part by the federal government.
116
Although their precise structures vary, they enjoy a number of common
characteristics: they can sue and be sued, enter into contracts, hold property,
and borrow.
117
Some government corporations borrow on an off-balance-
sheet basis, meaning their debt is not an obligation of the federal
112. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (describing the widespread use of non-
recourse financing through SPEs in corporate finance).
113. See Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 386–91 (1994) (providing
an overview of the history of federal government corporations); see also A. Michael
Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 546 (1995)
(“Congress has created a new government corporation every year or so sinceWorldWar II.”).
114. Froomkin, supra note 113, at 546.
115. Id. at 548. The U.S. government also used SPEs to respond to the global financial
crisis of 2007-08. In order to stabilize and bring liquidity back to the commercial paper
markets, the U.S. Federal Reserve created, among other SPEs, the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (“CPFF”) to operate as a lender of last resort for those markets by purchasing
commercial paper for which corporate issuers were unable to find buyers. Tobias Adrian,
Karin Kimbrough & Dina Marchioni, The Federal Reserve’s Commercial Paper Funding
Facility, 17 FRBNY ECON. POL’YREV. 25, 38 (2011). Similarly, the Fed created the Money
Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF) SPE to provide liquidity to U.S. money market
investors. Money Market Investor Funding Facility, BOARDGOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., htt
p://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mmiff.htm [https://perma.cc/DR35-9HP7] (last
visited Apr. 24, 2012). The federal government also used an SPE, labeled the Resolution
Trust Corporation, to respond to the Savings & Loan crisis of the 1980s. DONALDAXELROD,
SHADOWGOVERNMENT: THEHIDDENWORLD OF PUBLICAUTHORITIES 2 (1992).
116. See 5 U.S.C. § 103 (1966) (defining government corporation as “a corporation owned
or controlled by the Government of the United States”).
117. Froomkin, supra note 113, at 553.
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government.
118
Government-sponsored entities (“GSE”s) share many of the
characteristics of wholly-owned and mixed-ownership government
corporations, but they are not government-owned.
119
Instead, they are
privately-owned and operated entities, created through federal charters.
120
Because the purpose of GSEs is to perform “activities to certain economic
sectors deemed worthy of public support,” they are given “certain
advantages to help accomplish their public purposes.”
121
The federal
government is not usually obligated for GSE debt.
122
SPE debt for which a government is not obligated should not directly
contribute to unsustainability. Sometimes, however, a government may have
little choice but to stand behind SPE debt—dramatically illustrated during
the global financial crisis by the federal government’s backstopping of the
debt of SPEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
123
Originally formed as a
government agency to purchase mortgage loans, Fannie Mae was privatized
as a GSE in 1968 because the Johnson administration wanted to get its debt
off the federal government’s books, in order to reduce the size of the national
debt.
124
Congress created Freddie Mac as a GSE in 1970 for the purpose of
securitizing loans made by the savings and loan (“S&L”) banking industry.
125
As GSEs, Fannie and Freddie benefited from the market’s assumption
that the federal government implicitly guaranteed their debt, including the
mortgage guarantees they provided.
126
Among other things, they could
118. See, e.g., VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., GUARANTEED TO FAIL: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE
MAC, AND THE DEBACLE OF MORTGAGE FINANCE 102 (2010) (observing that some GSEs
operate as off-balance-sheet special purpose entities of the U.S. government).
119. This is true at least as an initial matter. As will be discussed infra, the mortgage
finance GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, had to be taken over and are now owned by the
government. See ACHARYA ET AL. at 59 (noting that the GSEs were placed into
conservatorship in 2008 due to their financial instability).
120. Block, supra note 66, at 435.
121. GSEs: Recent Trends and Policy: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 105th Cong. 7 (1997) (statement
of James L. Bothwell, Chief Economist, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office). GSE advantages
include tax exemptions, exemption from SEC registration requirements, and access to U.S.
Treasury Department lines of credit. Block, supra note 66, at 436.
122. Block, supra note 66, at 438 (observing that such debt is therefore not included in
presidential or congressional budgeting).
123. Cf. infra notes 164–171 and accompanying text (discussing why subnational
governments sometimes might have little choice politically but to assume SPE liability).
124. ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 118, at 16–17.
125. See supra note 118, at 18 (describing Fannie Mae’s practice of securitizing loans in
the 1970s and early 1980s).
126. See supra note 118, at 21, 27 (describing Fannie Mae’s “special status” that made the
financial markets believe that Fannie Mae was implicitly guaranteed by the government).
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borrow at lower rates than competing firms,
127
notwithstanding explicit
disclosure that their debt did not constitute full-faith-and-credit obligations
of the federal government.
128
That motivated them to take on significant
debt, causing their debt-to-equity leverage ratios for the 1992-2007 period to
range from twenty to forty.
129
By the end of 2007, Fannie and Freddie were
indebted for $3.50 trillion in mortgage guarantees, a $1.43 trillion mortgage
portfolio, and a $2.26 trillion derivatives position.
130
Fifty percent of this
debt was held by financial institutions, making a default systemically
risky.
131
In September 2008, the federal government had little choice but to
bail out these GSEs to prevent their default and to promote stability and
liquidity in the housing markets.
132
SPE debt might also contribute to unsustainability, at least indirectly,
by allocating specific government revenue to payment of that debt, thereby
making that revenue unavailable for payment of general obligation debt and
providing public services. This is discussed further in the context of
subnational non-recourse financing.
127. See supra note 118, at 21–22, 27–28 (explaining the implications of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac’s special lending status). They also benefited from extraordinarily low capital
requirements: for investing in mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”), they were required to
hold only 2.50% capital compared to federally insured banks that were required to hold 4.0%
capital. Supra note 118, at 24.
128. Supra note 118, at 27. Cf. Block, supra note 66, at 437 (referencing investor
perception of an implicit U.S. government backing of Fannie Mae’s debt and observing that
“investor perception of an implicit . . . government guarantee is hard to break”). In 2005,
then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Alan Greenspan explained the inconsistency
between the disclosure and the market’s assumption:
Although prospectuses for GSE debt are required by law to stipulate that such
investments are not backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government,
investors worldwide have concluded that our government will not allow GSEs to
default. . . . Virtually none of [Fannie and Freddie’s] excess return reflects higher
yields on assets; it is almost wholly attributable to subsidized borrowing costs.
Supra note 68, at 29–30.
129. Supra note 66, at 25. In comparison, the leverage ratio of an average commercial
bank during this period ranged from 10 to 15. Supra note 66, at 25.
130. ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 118, at 59.
131. See id. at 26, 54 (stating that “pulling the plug on the GSEs would have created a 50%
sucking sound from the mortgage finance market”).
132. Lorraine Woellert & John Gittelson, Fannie – Freddie Fix at $160 Billion with $1
Trillion Worst Case, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 13, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.c
om/news/2010-06-13/fannie-freddie-fix-expands-to-160-billion-with-worst-case-at-1-trillion
.html [https://perma.cc/C77Z-K4DH].
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III. PROACTIVERESOLUTION OF SUBNATIONALDEBT
The same general strategies used for proactively resolving sovereign
debt also should apply to resolving subnational debt. Certain features of
those strategies will differ, however, because of differences between
sovereign and subnational debtors.
133
Until relatively recently, one such difference made proactive resolution
less important for subnationals than for sovereigns: subnationals used to rely
heavily on traditional bank lending, whereas sovereigns rely heavily on the
issuance of bonds. Because bank lenders usually are easily identifiable and
relatively few in number,
134
troubled subnational debtors found it easier to
negotiate a debt restructuring.
135
The current trend, however, is for
subnationals (like sovereigns) to issue bonds to obtain financing.
136
If that
trend continues, proactive resolution will become as important for
subnationals as it is for sovereigns.
Another difference is that a sovereign debtor that is concerned that the
debt of its subnational units might become unsustainable
137
could require
133. Certain other differences between sovereign and subnational debtors relate to
proactive resolution but are only indirectly relevant to this Article’s analysis. For example, a
national government usually can require its subnational governments proactively to resolve
their debt. Cf. Douglas Sutherland, Robert Price & Isabelle Joumard, Fiscal Rules for Sub-
Central Governments: Design and Impact 14–16 (OECDNetwork on Fiscal Relations Across
Levels of Government, Working Paper No. 1, 2006) (discussing precedents for nations to
impose borrowing constraints and balanced budget rules on their subnational units); UNTIL
DEBTDOUS PART: SUBNATIONALDEBT, INSOLVENCY, ANDMARKETS 26 (Otaviano Canuto &
Lili Liu eds., 2013) (“Ex ante constraints on subnational borrowers include procedural rules
for incurring debt, limits on debt and deficit ceilings, rules for borrowing in international
markets, and regulation of subnationals’ borrowing based on fiscal capacity criteria.”).
134. Banks tend to be relatively few and concentrated in most developing or developed
countries. See, e.g., Banking System Concentration – Country Rankings,
GLOBALECONOMY.COM, https://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/banking_system_con
centration/ [https://perma.cc/Z6UD-NLXH] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019) (displaying bank
concentration percentages by country). Even though U.S. banks tend to be more numerous,
the concentration has risen considerably in the past few decades. 5-Bank Asset Concentration
for U.S., FED. RES. ECON. DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDOI06USA156NWDB [h
ttps://perma.cc/KNK3-MB2E] (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
135. Cf. supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the collection action
impediment to a debt restructuring).
136. See, e.g., Otaviano Canuto & Lili Liu, Subnational Debt Finance: Make It
Sustainable, in THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW – A HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC
POLICY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 219, 220 (Otaviano Canuto & Marcelo Giugale eds.,
2010) (observing that “[s]ubnational bonds increasingly compete with traditional bank loans”
in certain countries).
137. As discussed, a sovereign might become concerned because it might feel compelled
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those units to maintain certain minimum portions of their debt in proactively
resolvable form. That effectively would parallel the post-crisis efforts of
regulators to require systemically important firms to issue some portion of
their debt in proactively resolvable form.
138
A. Convertible Financing
As with convertible sovereign financing, two issues are integral to
designing convertible subnational financing: What should trigger
conversion, and into what should the debt then convert? Convertible
subnational financing also raises the same additional issues: whether the
convertible financing will be economically viable and whether the
conversion itself could have harmful consequences.
1. What Should Trigger Conversion?
Subnational governments, like sovereigns, lack obvious financial
accounting triggers, such as insolvency, that signal unsustainability.
However, just as for a sovereign,
139
a debt-to-GDP ratio might be used as a
trigger event for subnational debt if the subnational government’s GDP can
be defined. I later examine that in the context of discussing variable
subnational financing linked to GDP.
140
Another possible trigger takes inspiration from the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. In a municipal bankruptcy context, Chapter 9 of that Code provides a
functional test for unsustainability in its cram-down requirement
141
that,
to stand behind the debt of its subnational units (see supra notes 123–132 and accompanying
text) or because unsustainable subnational debt can otherwise contribute to a sovereign debt
burden (see supra note 22 and accompanying text).
138. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text (explaining the economic rationale of
contingent capital and its potential role in crisis prevention).
139. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (giving examples of sovereign debt
restructuring).
140. See infra notes 156–157 and accompanying text (describing different ways to define
a state’s GDP).
141. Cram down enables a municipal debtor to force acceptance of a debt-restructuring
plan over the objection of one or more dissenting classes of creditors if the plan is “in the best
interests of the creditors.” 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7). In making that determination, Chapter 9
incorporates the cram-down concept of Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which
requires the court to confirm a proposed reorganization plan that is, inter alia, “fair and
equitable, with respect to each class of claims,” despite the objection of creditors. 11 U.S.C.
§ 901(a) (2019); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2019). See also 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P
943.03 [1][f][i][B] (16th ed. 2019) (describing how the fair and equitable rule is applied in
chapter 9 cases).
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under the reorganization plan, the creditors are receiving “all that they ‘can
reasonably expect [to receive] in the circumstances.’”
142
This focuses on
whether the municipality has imposed reasonable austerity measures and has
made reasonable use of taxation to try to pay its creditors.
143
Although a
subnational might try to use a similar test as a trigger for convertible
financing, any such determination would be complex, fact-intensive, and
highly politically sensitive.
144
A municipality or other subnational
government cannot easily raise taxes to pay its debt, for example, because its
residents may simply move away.
145
In the Chapter 9 context, federal
bankruptcy courts make these determinations, yet the decisions are far from
consistent.
146
In jurisdictions lacking generally accepted norms about the
range of what constitutes reasonable taxation, these determinations would be
even more difficult. A more objective trigger would almost certainly be
needed.
By analogy to proposed conversion triggers for convertible sovereign
financing, a more objective trigger for subnational debt conversion might
consist of a third party providing emergency financial assistance to the
subnational government.
147
That trigger, however, would still be less
objective for subnationals than for sovereigns because the only third party
likely to provide that financial assistance to a subnational would be the
national government itself.
148
Conversion also may be more likely to be
triggered prematurely because of political pressure on national governments
142. Lorber v. Vista Irrigation Dist., 127 F.2d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 1942); see also In re City
of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 26 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (stating that “[f]or a plan of adjustment
to be confirmed . . . it must be ‘fair and equitable’ and ‘not discriminate unfairly’”).
143. See, e.g., Zack Clement & R. Andrew Black, How City Finances Can Be
Restructured: Learning from Both Bankruptcy and Contract Impairment Cases, 88 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 41, 41–55, 72–84 (2014) (stating ways in which state and federal laws may help
cities escape insolvency).
144. Schwarcz, supra note 11, at 364.
145. Subnational Debt Problem, supra note 20, at 1184. That can even exacerbate the
government’s problem if the subnational region’s economic output declines. Id.
146. Sovereign Debt Restructuring, supra note 11, at 364.
147. Cf. supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing this same type of conversion
trigger for convertible sovereign financing).
148. See, e.g., Jürgen von Hagen, Subnational Government Bailouts in OECD Countries:
Four Case Studies (Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper No. 126, Nov. 2000)
(discussing bailouts of subnational governments in Australia, Germany, Italy, and Sweden),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1814672 [https://perma.cc/4AMW-79
MF]; Eva Jenkner & Zhonglin Lu, Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts–Who
Pays the Premium? (IMF Working Paper 14/20, Jan. 2014), https://www.imf.org/external/p
ubs/ft/wp/2014/wp1420.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BZE-LJ3H] (discussing Spain’s bailout of
certain subnational governments).
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to bail out their financially troubled subnational units.
149
Investors may
demand a high premium to offset the risk that the repayment terms of their
convertible subnational debt would be so subject to the national
government’s whim.
150
2. Into What Should the Debt Convert?
In theory, subnational debt and sovereign debt could convert the same
ways: reduce principal of the debt, reduce the interest rate on the debt, and/or
extend the maturity of the debt. As with convertible sovereign-debt
financing, extending maturity of subnational debt would help to address
liquidity whereas reducing principal would help to address insolvency.
151
Reducing the interest rate would contribute to addressing both of those
concerns.
152
3. Will the Convertible Financing Be Economically Viable?
This question can only be answered empirically, and its answer may
well change depending on the particular subnational government that issues
the debt.
153
As previously observed, convertible financing that only extends
maturities might be less expensive to issue than convertible financing that
reduces principal.
154
149. Cf. Canuto & Liu, supra note 136, at 224–25 (discussing the creditor perception that
the national government implicitly guarantees its subnational debt). This tendency could itself
foster moral hazard, encouraging subnational fiscal irresponsibility and imprudent lending to
subnational governmental units. Cf. Otaviano Canuto & Lili Liu, Subnational Debt,
Insolvency, and Market Development 2–3 (TheWorld Bank, Economic Premise Number 112,
Apr. 2013), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/EP112.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/7YP7-ZUG5] (discussing subnational debt crises and the concomitant moral
hazards); Mary Williams Marsh, Puerto Rico May Get Help from Unlikely Source: Its
Lenders, N.Y TIMES (Sep. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/puerto-
rico-hurricane-bondholders.html (suggesting in part that recent imprudent hedge-fund lending
to Puerto Rico was induced by moral hazard).
150. See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliability of
conventional triggers, such as GDP).
151. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (addressing issues of solvency and
liquidity in the context of sovereign convertible financing).
152. Supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text (discussing the necessarily empirical
aspects of the question, such as a subnational government’s willingness to pay an investor the
demanded interest premium).
154. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text (discussing the rationale and risks of
convertible financing that extends only to maturities and convertible financing that reduces
principal).
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4. Could the Conversion Itself Have Harmful Consequences?
In principle, this question’s analysis should be similar whether the
issuer of the convertible debt is a subnational or a sovereign. In both cases,
it turns in the first instance on whether the investors in the debt are
systemically important financial institutions that could incur significant
losses upon conversion, triggering systemic financial contagion.
155
In
practice, however, the amount of a sovereign issuer’s convertible debt may
far exceed that of a subnational issuer. Other things being equal, the smaller
the amount of debt converted, the smaller the losses to the investors; and thus
the smaller the risk that the conversion will trigger systemic financial
contagion.
B. Variable Financing
Like a sovereign borrower, subnational government borrowers could
try to link their variable financing to GDP if that could be defined. The U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, for example, defines a state’s GDP as “the
sum of value added from all industries in the state.”
156
Some subnationals
might also attempt to calculate practical alternatives to GDP, such as adding
together tax collections, funds received from the central government, and
revenues from the subnational’s sales of goods and services.
157
However,
government accounting may well be even less reliable and transparent for
subnationals than for nations.
158
Therefore, GDP-linked bonds may be even
harder to implement for subnationals than for sovereigns.
Some variables, however, may tie closely to subnational government
revenues. For example, subnationals whose income is substantially based
on the sale of commodities
159
could link variable financing to commodity
155. Supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
156. Glossary, BUREAU ECON. ANALYSIS, https://www.bea.gov/help/glossary/gross-
domestic-product-gdp-state [https://perma.cc/ZB4M-H2PW] (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
157. Cf. Taxes and State Revenue, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGS., http://www.ncsl.org/documen
ts/fiscal/TaxesandStateRevenue.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMG6-C88V] (proposing this method
of calculating U.S. state revenue).
158. See Violeta Vulovic, Sub-National Borrowing, Is It Really a Danger? 51 (Dec. 14,
2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia State University) (on file with Georgia State
University) (stating that “obtaining reliable financial information, especially from the sub-
national governments, often requires significant effort. Moreover, not all the sub-national
governments follow a standardized accounting plan, hold uniform registers of their assets and
liabilities, or publish information on debt and capacity to pay.”).
159. For example, the state of Alaska obtains a large portion of its revenues from oil &
gas production. Annual Report 2017, ALASKADEPT. REVENUE, http://www.tax.alaska.gov/p
rograms/programs/reports/AnnualReport.aspx?Year=2017 [https://perma.cc/7M4U-4TTM].
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prices or sales-based revenue.
160
Subnationals located in regions subject to
natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, or hurricanes, could link
variable financing to those conditions.
161
C. Non-Recourse Financing
At least in the United States, subnational governments widely use non-
recourse financing to minimize their debt-payment obligations and more
precisely allocate risks and rewards between debtors and creditors, reducing
information asymmetry.
162
Many U.S. states raise financing through SPEs,
with some states such as New York, New Jersey, and Virginia raising most
of their financing that way.
163
To the extent a subnational government is not
obligated on SPE debt, that debt should not contribute directly to the
government’s financial unsustainability.
As discussed, non-recourse government financing through SPEs can
also create risks if the government has little choice but to stand behind the
SPE debt.
164
Subnational governments often have strong economic and
reputational motivations to backstop the debt of their SPEs, notwithstanding
the absence of a legal obligation to do so. A default on that debt could signal
uncertainty as to whether the subnational will pay its debts generally, thereby
jeopardizing the subnational government’s credit rating.
165
For example, the
State of Ohio has stood behind the debt of one of its SPEs to reduce rating-
160. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing certain value recovery rights
linked to commodities such as oil).
161. See, e.g., Shakira Mustapha & Annalisa Prizzon, Africa’s Rising Debt: How to Avoid
a NewCrisis 11–12, ODI (Oct. 2018), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-doc
uments/12491.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3TQ-XW6L] (citing natural disasters as one possible
link for debt payments by sovereigns).
162. See, e.g., Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 66, at 376–79
(describing how states utilize special purpose entities to avoid constitutional debt limits and
allocate risk); ROBERTS.AMDURSKY, CLAYTONP.GILLETTE&ALLENBASS,MUNICIPALDEBT
FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 29–32 (1992) (discussing the popularity of municipal
revenue bonds, a type of non-recourse debt financing).
163. Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 66, at 370.
164. Because subnational government finance is often subject to less public scrutiny than
national government finance, the “off-balance-sheet” nature of non-recourse subnational debt
can also create a potential for abuse and possibly even prevent the subnational government’s
own bonds from being priced correctly based on fiscal risk. Special-Purpose Entities in
Public Finance, supra note 66, at 372.
165. See Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 66, at 381 (quoting,
among other sources, Standard & Poor’s, Moral Obligation Bonds 3 (June 27, 2006)
(observing that if “a properly structured moral obligation defaulted, despite clear original
legislative support, the state’s willingness to pay on its other debt would need to be
examined”)).
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agency scrutiny.
166
Similarly, the City of Chicago paid eighty percent of the
back interest on bonds issued by the Calumet Skyway Authority due to a
“feeling that a bond default by the Authority might damage the city’s overall
bond rating.”
167
Markets and investors likewise believe that the economic
compulsion to avoid increased borrowing costs resulting from a default on
SPE debt provides “enough incentive for the state to pay” that debt to avoid
a default.
168
Subnational governments may have other reasons, too, to support
payment of their SPE debt (even though they are not legally obligated to do
so). If an SPE operates as an integral part of the subnational government,
such as providing the water supply, the government may have no practical
choice but to support the SPE in order to ensure uninterrupted government
services—essentially a “too important to fail” variant of the corporate notion
of too-big-to-fail.
169
A subnational government also may support payment
of an SPE’s debt in order to honor a moral obligation,
170
or even to protect
the government’s reputation more generally.
171
For all of these reasons, a subnational government may feel more
compelled than a sovereign to backstop the debt of its SPEs, notwithstanding
the absence of a legal obligation to do so. To that extent, the SPE debt may
add to the unsustainability of the subnational’s debt. It therefore will be
important, when designing non-recourse subnational financing, to try to
reduce the likelihood that the subnational will feel compelled to stand behind
the SPE debt.
Furthermore, SPE debt might indirectly contribute to a government’s
financial unsustainability by allocating specific government revenue to
166. Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 66, at 381.
167. JERRY MITCHELL, THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT WITH GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS
97 (1999) (citations omitted).
168. Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 66, at 381.
169. See Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 66, at 381–82 (discussing
governments’ rationale for backstopping their essential SPEs).
170. See Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 66, at 382 (analyzing the
potential moral obligation to pay arising out of an issuance of moral-obligation debt or
appropriation contingent debt).
171. See Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, supra note 68, at 382 (addressing the
potential for reputational loss with investors). In a corporate context, for example, at the
outset of the global financial crisis many banks backstopped their affiliated structured
investment vehicles (“SIV”s) solely to protect the banks’ reputations. In the case of Citigroup,
this occurred notwithstanding that it reduced the capital ratio that regulators monitor to gauge
that bank’s ability to withstand losses on bad loans and caused Moody’s to lower the bank’s
long-term credit rating. The reputational harm of not supporting payment of an SPE’s debt
may be even greater in a subnational government than a corporate context. Special-Purpose
Entities in Public Finance, supra note 66, at 382–83.
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payment of that debt, thereby making that revenue unavailable for payment
of general obligation debt and providing public services.
172
Some argue, for
example, that the allocation of certain Puerto Rican sales taxes to payment
of billions of dollars of bonds issued by Puerto Rico’s Sales Tax Financing
Corporation, known as COFINA, may have unfairly deprived that island’s
general obligation bondholders and made it more difficult to provide public
services.
173
To ensure fairness, the process of designing non-recourse
subnational (and even sovereign) financing should be public and
transparent.
174
CONCLUSIONS
Sovereign and subnational governments urgently need help in resolving
unsustainable debt burdens. Informed by proactive strategies that could help
systemically important financial firms resolve unsustainable debt, this
Article examines and assesses the legal and economic viability of designing
proactive strategies for resolving unsustainable governmental debt. Whether
addressing firms or governments, the strategies should follow the same
principles: convert borderline unsustainable debt into sustainable financing,
through pre-planning, or try to prevent the debt from approaching
unsustainability.
The Article then analyzes how a government could implement these
strategies. For example, it could implement the first by issuing at least part
of its debt with provisions that, in the future, reduce its principal or interest
or extend its maturities if needed to make the debt sustainable. It could
implement the second in at least two ways: by tying the amounts and/or
maturities of payments on the debt to variables that correspond to the
debtor’s ability to pay, or by limiting recourse on the debt to specified assets
or revenue sources of the debtor. The Article also compares the costs and
172. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (examining issues and risks of
subnationals’ non-recourse financing).
173. See, e.g., Abner Dennis & Kevin Connor, Hedge Funds Win, Puerto Ricans Lose in
First Debt Restructuring Deal, AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 8, 2019), https://prospect.org/article/he
dge-funds-win-puerto-ricans-lose-first-debt-restructuring-deal [https://perma.cc/ZNL9-JKH
N] (arguing, among other things, that “[t]he restructuring plan for . . . COFINA debt carries
grave consequences for the vast majority of Puerto Ricans: Money that could be funding
health care, education, and a just recovery from 2017’s hurricanes and a 13-year economic
depression will instead pad the pockets of hedge-fund billionaires and their wealthy
investors”).
174. Cf. id. (basing most of their ire on the fact that the “public was excluded from
participating in this decision at every stage, underscoring the deeply undemocratic character
of the whole process”).
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benefits of pursuing these strategies.
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APPENDIX
Recommendations for Designing Proactive Resolution
Following the Article’s detailed discussion, this Appendix briefly
summarizes the recommendations for proactively resolving sovereign and
subnational government debt to make it sustainable. The Article identifies
three approaches.
The first approach is (1) “convertible financing,” which focuses on the
strategy of converting borderline unsustainable government debt into
sustainable financing, through pre-planning. The second and third
approaches focus on the strategy of trying to prevent the debt from
approaching unsustainability; these approaches are divided, respectively,
into (2) “variable financing,” which ties the amounts and/or maturities of
payments on the debt to variables that correspond to the government’s ability
to pay, and (3) “non-recourse financing,” which limits recourse on the debt
to only specified assets or revenue sources of the government.
This Appendix outlines the application of each of these approaches to
sovereign and subnational debt. Although those applications are generally
similar, they sometimes will vary because of differences between sovereign
and subnational debtors. A sovereign debtor that is concerned that the debt
of its subnational units might become unsustainable also could require those
units to maintain certain minimum portions of their debt in proactively
resolvable form.
175. A government ideally should implement these strategies by negotiating provisions
into new or existing debt contracts. Cf. supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing
inclusion of proactive conversion provisions in the original debt contract). Although a
government could try retroactively to legislate these strategies into existing debt contracts,
especially if those contracts are governed by the government’s law, retroactive legislation
would likely anger creditors and impair the government’s ability to attract future financing.
It also might violate international law, which only permits retroactivity that is neither
discriminatory nor arbitrary nor amounts to expropriation. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 918–21 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). Retroactivity that
unilaterally reduces a debt claim’s principal amount or interest rate, for example, might be
seen as expropriation. Cf. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 550
(5th ed. 1998) (observing that, in the context of breaching a contract, “the situation in which
the state exercises its executive or legislative authority to destroy the contractual rights as an
asset comes within the ambit of expropriation”). The expropriating government could then
be liable under international law to compensate the injured parties. OPPENHEIM’S
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 175.
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(1) Convertible Financing.
Designing convertible financing confronts four issues: what should
trigger conversion; into what should the debt then convert; will the
convertible financing be economically viable; and could the conversion itself
have harmful consequences.
Determining what should trigger conversion must recognize that the
financial condition of governments, unlike that of corporations, cannot be
measured easily or reliably. Because most nations periodically calculate
their GDP, a debt-to-GDP ratio could serve as a sovereign debt conversion
trigger. However, government calculations of GDP can be unreliable and
uncertain, and government financial transparency is generally low. A more
reliable conversion trigger might be the sovereign receiving emergency
financial assistance from a multilateral organization such as the IMF or the
European Stability Mechanism. Designing a subnational debt conversion
trigger is even more difficult. A debt-to-GDP ratio may not work because
GDP is usually a national calculation, although subnational governments
sometimes define their GDP. Basing the conversion trigger on the
subnational government receiving emergency financial assistance might not
be objective because the party likely to provide that assistance would be the
national government itself.
Determining into what the debt should convert would, again, work
differently for governments than corporations. In the corporate context,
convertible financing normally converts into equity (i.e., an ownership
interest rather than a debt claim). Because there are not ownership interests
in governments, government financing—whether of a sovereign or
subnational government—could convert into debt with reduced principal
and/or interest rate or extended maturities, as needed to make the converted
debt sustainable.
Determining whether the convertible government financing will be
economically viable depends on whether governments will be willing to pay
the interest premium demanded by investors to extend that financing. That
is an empirical question that cannot be answered in the abstract. Other things
being equal, however, convertible financing that only allows maturity
extensions might be less costly than convertible financing that allows
principal reductions, so long as the government is required to pay a market
rate of interest during the extensions. These observations appear to be
equally applicable to both sovereign and subnational convertible financing.
Determining whether the conversion itself could have harmful
consequences turns on whether investors in the convertible financing are
systemically important (such as large banks or pension funds), and whether
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they would incur significant losses upon conversion. If systemically
important investors incur significant losses, the conversion might trigger
systemic financial contagion. Although there may be no perfect solution to
this concern, possible second-best solutions might include limiting the
amount of convertible government financing in which a systemically
important firm would be allowed to invest. Also, other things being equal,
sovereign convertible financing would be systemically riskier than
subnational convertible financing if, as often would be the case, the amount
of the former exceeds that of the latter.
(2) Variable Financing.
The relevant variables could be the government’s GDP or other factors
linked to the government’s creditworthiness such as its commodity-export
prices. Although no country has yet issued bonds linked to these types of
variables, there is strong regulatory interest in GDP-linked bonds in order to
reduce the likelihood of future sovereign debt crises.
There is limited experience with warrants linked to GDP or commodity-
export prices, which were issued to enhance the attractiveness of sovereign
bond exchanges. Because these warrants did not affect future payments on
the exchanged bonds, they do not provide clear precedent for using variable
government financing as a proactive resolution strategy. Nonetheless, the
history of payments on these warrants suggests that sovereigns take their
variable financing obligations seriously.
Opinion remains divided, however, as to whether variable government
financing will be economically viable. As mentioned, government
calculations of GDP can be unreliable and uncertain. Variable government
financing therefore should be designed with protection for underreporting
GDP or other relevant variables. Such protection might include designating
a respected independent body to monitor and enforce data integrity,
including providing an independent source of GDP data.
It may be even more difficult to link variable subnational financing to
GDP, unless (as mentioned above) the subnational government defines its
GDP. Subnational government accounting, however, is even less reliable
and transparent than national government accounting. Alternatively,
subnationals might attempt to calculate practical alternatives to GDP, such
as adding together tax collections, funds received from the central
government, and revenues from the subnational’s sales of goods and
services. Subnationals whose income is substantially based on the sale of
commodities also could try to link their variable financing to commodity
prices or sales-based revenue.
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The future market viability of variable government financing also will
turn on its cost. Investors would be expected to demand compensation for
the additional repayment risk posed by variable financing: if the
government’s revenues decrease, investors not only would face an increased
default risk but also might receive reduced payments on the debt.
(3) Non-Recourse Financing.
In non-recourse financing, a government would set up one or more
special-purpose entities (“SPE”s), which obtain financing from investors.
The investors seek repayment from the SPE, which the government
capitalizes with high-quality financial assets, such as payments expected to
be generated from an income-producing project or rights to the future
payment of specified tax revenues.
Non-recourse national government financing has significant precedent
in some jurisdictions, such as the United States. U.S. subnational
governments, including states, also widely use non-recourse financing.
Because the investors only have recourse to the SPE, not to the government
itself, SPE debt should not contribute directly to the government’s debt
burden.
Notwithstanding the non-recourse nature of the SPE debt, a government
sometimes may have little choice but to stand behind that debt. In a
sovereign context, this occurred during the global financial crisis when the
U.S. government backstopped the debt of its mortgage-loan-originating
SPEs (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) to prevent their default and to promote
stability and liquidity in the housing markets. Subnational governments also
have backstopped an SPE’s debt, in some cases to protect their credit rating
and in other cases to ensure uninterrupted government services of an SPE
that operates as an integral part of the subnational government (such as
providing the water supply). Non-recourse debt should be designed to try to
reduce the likelihood that the government will feel compelled to stand behind
that debt.
SPE debt might indirectly contribute to a government’s financial
unsustainability by allocating specific government revenue to payment of
that debt, thereby making that revenue unavailable for payment of general
obligation debt and providing public services. To ensure fairness, the
process of designing non-recourse government financing should be public
and transparent.
